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“Even in the best of circumstances, it is difficult for any one of us to raise 
children alone.  And when single parents try, they have to perform roles 
outside their usual repertoire, or get others to take on those roles.  Even 
families with two parents rely on the village for functions that are beyond their 
scope.”1 
                              —Hillary Rodham Clinton 
                                                 
 + Associate Professor, The University of New Mexico School of Law; The University of 
California at Berkeley, B.A., 1991; Georgetown University Law Center, J.D., 1996. The author 
wishes to thank Erik Gerding and Mary Leto Pareja for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
The opinions expressed in this Article are solely those of the author, as are any omissions or 
errors. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Bartering is the trading of one product or service for another.”2  It may 
occur either (1) “on an informal one-on-one basis” or (2) “on a third party 
basis through a modern barter exchange company.”3  It would include, for 
example, a babysitting cooperative (co-op) in which members exchange time 
babysitting each other’s children,4 a carpooling group in which members 
exchange rides to school or work,5 a community-based “Hour Dollars” 
program in which a charitable organization facilitates the exchange of services 
among community members,6 a pet-care exchange program,7 a vegetable 
exchange in which home-grown tomatoes are traded for a neighbor’s home-
grown squash,8 an academic website through which homes are swapped for 
vacations and sabbaticals,9 a barter club in which legal services may be offered 
for house painting,10 an agreement in which original artwork is traded for the 
artist’s use of an apartment,11 or any exchanges of property12 or services 
through a barter-exchange website.13 
                                                 
 2. Do You Barter?, http://www.docstoc.com/docs/14125818/Do-You-Barter (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2010) [hereinafter Do You Barter?]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See, e.g., Garden Hills Babysitting Co-Op, http://gardenhillsbabysittingcoop.org/ (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2010); How to Create a Neighborhood Babysitting Cooperative, 
http://www.wkkf.org/Pubs/GreaterBC/Babysitting_coop_00254_02987.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 
2010); Smart Mom’s Babysitting Co-op Startup Kit, http://www.babysittingcoop.com/?page=1 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2010).  A simple Internet search reveals an abundance of information 
regarding babysitting co-ops.  Babysitting Co-op—Google Search, http://www.google.com/ 
(search “Babysitting Co-op”) (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).  See BabysitterExchange—Learn More, 
http://www.babysitterexchange.com/servlet/Main.jsp?Act=get LearnMore (last visited Apr. 13, 
2010) [hereinafter BabysitterExchange] for an example of an exchange in which community 
members swap babysitting, errands, pick-ups, drop-offs, pet-sitting, carpooling, personal services, 
home repair, and tutoring. 
 5. See, e.g., iCarpool—Carpool Made Easy, http://www.icarpool.com/en/MainPage.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2010). 
 6. See, e.g., Hour Dollars Service Exchange Program, http://hourdollars.com (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2010).  In this community program, community members exchange services, such as 
lawn care, for points that may be redeemed for other services, such as babysitting.  Id.  In general, 
these programs are created with a broad charitable purpose in mind.  Kara McGuire, Who Needs 
Cash? Barter Can Be Better than Buying, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), June 14, 
2008, available at http://www.startribune.com/19943909.html?page=1&c=y. 
 7. See, e.g., BabysitterExchange, supra note 4. 
 8. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 9. See, e.g., AcademicHomes.com, http://www.academichomes.com (last visited Apr. 13, 
2010); HomeLink USA International, http://homelink-usa.com/index.html (last visited Apr. 13, 
2010). 
 10. See Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60, at 61–62. 
 11. Id. 
 12. The term “property” is used interchangeably with the term “goods” throughout this 
Article; neither is meant to include cash or cash equivalents, such as publicly traded stock. 
 13. See, e.g., BarterBee.com—The Cheapest Way to Trade Movies, Music, and Games!, 
http://www.barterbee.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2010); Barter Bucks Banc, 
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Notwithstanding its popularity, there is widespread confusion regarding the 
tax effect of bartering.14  This confusion results because the rules on whether a 
barterer must include property or services received in gross income differ from 
the rules on whether a company that facilitates bartering has a duty to report 
barter transactions to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).15 
The recipient of bartered property or services must treat the fair market 
value of that property or services the same as cash for federal income tax 
purposes regardless of whether the recipient was bartering on a commercial 
basis or merely informally.16  Thus, if the recipient performed services in 
immediate exchange for a ring worth $500, “Time Dollars” worth $500,17 or 
services worth $500, the recipient will have $500 of taxable income in the year 
in which he performed the services regardless of his reasons for performing.18  
Similarly, if the recipient traded a violin for that same ring, “Time Dollars,” or 
services, he would be treated as if he sold the violin for $500.19 
However, the rules are different for a company that facilitates bartering.  
Although the parties to a barter must declare income from an exchange, a 
company that facilitates a barter has a distinct duty to report the transaction to 
the IRS.20  This reporting requirement is similar to an employer issuing a W-2 
to an employee and the IRS.21  It also parallels a real-estate broker sending 
information regarding a home sale to the buyer, the seller, and the IRS on a 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.barterbucks.us (last visited Apr. 13, 2010); Do You Barter?, supra note 2; 
Swapthings.com, http://www.swapthings.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2010); see also Albuquerque 
Barter Classifieds—Craigslist, http://albuquerque.craigslist.org/bar (last visited Apr. 13, 2010). 
 14. Compare McGuire, supra note 6 (“If you’re trading professional services, such as a 
carpenter making cabinets for a dentist who will fill his cavity, the value of those goods and 
services may be subject to income tax.” (emphasis added)), and Barter Frequently Asked 
Questions, http://www.bartertrainer.com/faqs.asp (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) (“The Internal 
Revenue Service considers barter income as the same as cash for income tax purposes.”), with 
Jim Wang, Four Ways You’re Unknowingly Cheating on Your Taxes, BARGAINEERING, June 23, 
2008, http://www.bargaineering.com/articles/four-ways-youre-unknowingly-cheating-on-
taxes.html (“If you trade your services with someone else on a contract and commercial basis, 
you have to claim the value of services received on your 1040 Schedule C form . . . .  So taking 
turns mowing lawns with your neighbor without claiming the ‘barter income’ is okay.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 15. See IRS.gov, Tax Responsibilities of Bartering Participants, http://www.irs.gov/ 
businesses/small/article/0,,id=188095,00.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2010). 
 16. See infra Part I.A. 
 17. This is similar to an “Hour Dollars” program.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
See also Vada Waters Lindsey, The Burden of Being Poor: Increased Tax Liability?  The 
Taxation of Self-Help Programs, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 225, 225–27 (1999) (describing a 
“Time Dollars” program in Saint Louis, Missouri). 
 18. See Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 C.B. 100, at 100–01. 
 19. See id. 
 20. Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(f) (2009). 
 21. See I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1(e) (2009). 
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Form 1099.22  The IRS refers to a company that facilitates bartering, 
confusingly, as a “barter exchange.”23  According to the IRS, 
     A barter exchange is any person or organization with members or 
clients that contract with each other (or with the barter exchange) to 
jointly trade or barter property or services.  The term does not 
include arrangements that provide solely for the informal exchange 
of similar services on a noncommercial basis.24 
This definition has led many people to either mistakenly believe or assertively 
argue that noncommercial barter transactions are not taxed.25  This is incorrect.  
A transaction does not have to be connected to a “barter exchange” to be 
taxable.26  Rather, the definition only triggers a reporting obligation by the 
person or organization facilitating a barter transaction.27  To avoid a term that 
is obviously causing a great deal of confusion, this Article will use the term 
“barter-exchange company” to refer to a person or organization that facilitates 
barter exchanges. 
The reality is that the IRS has not made a significant effort to tax barter 
transactions other than those that are reported by barter-exchange companies.28  
As Professor Bryan Camp has said, 
     [I]n the absence of cash, taxpayers may not understand they have 
reportable income and, if they do understand, may have difficulty in 
setting aside cash from other transactions to pay the resulting tax.  
Thus, when bartering is done informally and directly between 
                                                 
 22. Compare DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OMB NO. 1545-0715, 
FORM 1099-B: PROCEEDS FROM BROKER AND BARTER EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS (2010), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1099b.pdf, with DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., OMB NO. 1545-0715, FORM 1099-S: PROCEEDS FROM REAL ESTATE 
TRANSACTIONS (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1099s.pdf.  Of course, the 
facilitator also receives income from its commission or fee, if any, just as a real-estate broker 
would. 
 23. See Do You Barter?, supra note 2.  I say “confusingly” because the term could also 
easily be interpreted to refer to a barter transaction itself. 
 24. IRS.gov, Bartering Tax Center, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=187 
920,00.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) [hereinafter Bartering Tax Center]. 
 25. See, e.g., Barter Exchanges, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=113437, 
00.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) (“The term does not include arrangements that provide solely 
for the informal exchange of similar services on a noncommercial basis.”); see also Bryan T. 
Camp, The Play’s the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 41 (2007) 
(“Under the IRS ruling, if a group of co-workers decide to carpool together, they do not have to 
report the value of the transportation services they receive from each other as income, even 
though each member of the carpool has received economic wealth from the swap.  Similarly, a 
group of families who swap child-care services are not taxed on the economic wealth they thereby 
create for each other in the same-service trade.”).  Professor Camp and I have a friendly 
disagreement regarding the taxability of these arrangements.  See infra Part I.A.2. 
 26. See infra Part II.A. 
 27. See infra Part II.A; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1 (2009). 
 28. See infra Part II.A. 
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taxpayers, there may be a high level of noncompliance in reporting 
the income received.  Since it is very difficult to conduct one’s 
affairs through direct barter, direct bartering occurs at a very low 
level, peripheral to the economy.  Accordingly, with no systemic 
compliance issue, there is no administrative pressure to police these 
transactions systemically.  Even though a few folks may escape 
reporting their economic gain as gross income, the leakage is small 
enough that it does not present significant issues of nonuniformity or 
incoherence in the law; it does not make suckers out of honest 
taxpayers.29 
The question, then, is: if the IRS is not policing barter transactions other than 
when they occur through barter-exchange companies, why bother changing the 
law to nearly eliminate taxation on barter transactions outside of those 
performed by barter-exchange companies?  There are six simple, but 
important, reasons supporting a change in the law.  
First, tax law influences behavior, and our current law focuses on economics 
at the expense of community-building and the environment.30  Commonly, 
people barter because they do not have cash or do not want to spend cash to 
pay for the bartered property or services.31  In working-class and poorer 
communities, it is sensible to trade babysitting services, for example, so that 
community members can work.32  Likewise, in middle-class families, bartering 
may serve both as a way to save money and to bring community members 
together.  In this context, people might enter into carpool arrangements to save 
money on gas, help the environment by reducing air pollution, and build 
relationships with neighbors.  Tax law, whether regularly enforced or not, 
should not discourage this positive behavior. 
Second, the unenforced illegality of the failure to report barter transactions 
results in additional violations of and disrespect for the law.  When informed 
of the tax effect of bartering, some people will prefer to “come clean” and 
report the value of exchanged property or services.  However, others upon 
audit, may disclose bartering transactions to the IRS agent.  Still others, 
                                                 
 29. Camp, supra note 25, at 32–33 (footnotes omitted).  Given the widespread modern use 
of babysitting co-ops, carpool arrangements, house-sitting arrangements, and home vacation 
exchanges, as well as websites such as www.craigslist.com and www.swapthings.com to 
informally trade personal items, I believe that Professor Camp underestimates the pervasiveness 
of bartering in our modern society.  Certainly, technology has made it easier for an individual to 
replace regular economic activity with barter.  That said, Professor Camp is generally correct—
informal direct bartering still represents a relatively small fraction of each person’s economic 
activity and of the nation’s overall economic activity. 
 30. See infra Part IV. 
 31. See Robin Kaufman, “Living on the Cheap,” Is Barter Better?: Revenue Rulings and a 
Selective Analysis of the Effect of TRA 84 on Barter Transactions, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 641, 641 
(1985).  In this situation, the bartering is not “replacing” a regular taxable transaction.  Absent the 
ability to barter, the transaction likely would not occur at all. 
 32. See generally Lindsey, supra note 17, at 226. 
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perhaps the vast majority of people, likely will not report the activity.  If they 
know that they technically should report the activity and that a failure to report 
will go unpunished, they may conclude that, if that is the law, then “[t]he law 
is a[n] ass—a[n] idiot.”33  This disrespect for an unenforced law is likely to 
encourage other less innocuous forms of tax evasion.  
Third, taxation provisions can be used for political purposes.  For example, 
if the press or a rival political candidate learns that a candidate for public office 
or for political appointment has engaged in a taxable activity without reporting 
it, regardless of how common nonreporting may be, that information may be 
used against that candidate for political advantage.34 
Fourth, taxation of informal barter transactions favors those who try to take 
advantage of the tax system.  For example, it creates an added incentive to 
report barter income for those who barter solely to qualify for the Earned 
Income Credit.35 
Fifth, although revenue may be gained by taxing barter transactions, 
monitoring informal exchanges involving services and low-value personal 
assets would be an administrative nightmare.36  The greatest difficulty would 
be valuing the services and the assets.37 
Finally, people who prepare or give advice with respect to tax returns, such 
as accountants and lawyers, have legal and ethical duties to state the law as it is 
without considering whether an audit will be conducted.  For example, the 
American Bar Association explains that lawyers have an ethical duty to refrain 
from using “any colorable claim on a tax return to justify exploitation of the  
. . . audit selection process.”38  Similarly, accounting rules prevent accountants 
from taking a return position to exploit the audit lottery.39  The Treasury 
Department rules that apply to tax practitioners also provide that “[t]he 
possibility that a tax return will not be audited, that an issue will not be raised 
on audit, or that an issue will be settled may not be taken into account.”40  In 
addition, the Internal Revenue Code (Code) imposes penalties on a tax-return 
                                                 
 33. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 413–14 (M.A. Donohue & Co. 1950) (“‘If the law 
supposes that,’ said Mr. Bumble, squeezing his hat emphatically in both hands, ‘The law is a[n] 
ass—a[n] idiot.  If that’s the eye of the law, the law is a bachelor; and the worst I wish the law is, 
that his eye may be opened by experience—by experience.’”). 
 34. Cf. Claudia Wallis, The Lessons of Nannygate, TIME, Feb. 22, 1993, at 76. 
 35. See infra Part I.C. 
 36. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 37. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 38. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).  The opinion notes that Rule 
1.2(d) of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility mandates that “[a] lawyer shall not 
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent . . . .”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2008). 
 39. STATEMENT ON STANDARDS FOR TAX SERVICES No. 1, Tax Return Positions ¶¶ 3–4, at 
9 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2000) (current version at STATEMENT ON STANDARDS 
FOR TAX SERVICES No. 1, Tax Return Positions ¶¶ 5–8, at 10 (2009)). 
 40. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(d)(1) (2007). 
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preparer who understates a client’s tax liability based on an unrealistic 
position, or who willfully understates a client’s tax liability on a tax return.41  
In short, because all bartering creates taxable income under the law, lawyers 
and accountants must advise clients and prepare returns in conformity with 
this. 
This Article proposes that Congress should amend the Code.  First, the Code 
should immediately tax the exchange of services for either property or other 
services only if the taxpayer’s performance of those services constitutes or is in 
connection with a “trade or business” of that taxpayer.  Second, in general, the 
Code should require the taxpayer to immediately recognize gains on the 
exchange of personal property for either services or other property only if (1) 
that property is held for investment or in connection with a trade or business 
and (2) the exchange does not qualify for nonrecognition under a currently 
existing nonrecognition provision.42  This special nonrecognition rule should 
not apply to transfers of real property. 
If, in a barter that qualifies for nonrecognition under the proposed new rule, 
the taxpayer receives property, any gain should be deferred until a later sale of 
that property, if any, by the recipient.  On the other hand, if the taxpayer in a 
nonrecognition barter receives services, the receipt of those services should be 
completely tax-exempt.  The reason for different treatment is explained 
below.43 
This Article is divided into four parts.  Part I analyzes how tax law currently 
treats bartering.  It explains the problems with our current law, including the 
potential for abuse by taxpayers.  Part II discusses the current reporting 
requirement applicable to barter-exchange companies.  Part III discusses my 
proposal in detail.  Part IV concludes that the adoption of this proposal would 
help communities, improve taxpayer compliance, reduce the potential for 
abuse of power by the government, decrease the risk of tax fraud by taxpayers, 
simplify tax administration, and require attorneys and accountants to advise 
clients that they do not need to report informal noncommercial barter 
transactions on income tax returns. 
II.  IS THERE A TAXABLE EVENT? 
A.  The Law 
For federal income tax purposes, “gross income means all income from 
whatever source derived,” except as otherwise provided by law.44  This 
                                                 
 41. I.R.C. § 6694(a), (b) (2006 & Supp. 2007–2008).  The penalty is the greater of $5,000 or 
fifty percent of the income the preparer received from preparing the claim.  I.R.C. § 6694(b) 
(Supp. I 2007–2008). 
 42. See infra notes 239–50 and accompanying text. 
 43. See infra text accompanying notes 230–31. 
 44. I.R.C. § 61 (2006). 
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definition is liberally construed “in recognition of the intention of Congress to 
tax all gains except those specifically exempted.”45  The Treasury Regulations 
provide, in part, that “[g]ross income includes income realized in any form, 
whether in money, property, or services.”46  The Treasury Regulations further 
provide that if services are purchased with anything other than cash, “the fair 
market value of the property [or services] taken in payment must be included 
in income as compensation.”47   
The Code requires that an “item of gross income shall be included in the 
gross income for the taxable year in which [it was] received by the taxpayer, 
unless such amount is to be properly accounted for as of a different period” 
under the method of accounting used by the taxpayer to compute taxable 
income.48  The Treasury Regulations clarify this rule by requiring that items 
“be included in gross income for the taxable year in which they are actually or 
constructively received by the taxpayer.”49  The effect of these provisions is 
best explained by example: a person who babysits for another’s child through a 
babysitting co-op likely will have an immediate right to receive return 
services;50 accordingly, that person constructively receives income when she 
performs those services unless otherwise provided by law.51 
There are two ways the law may provide that property or services received 
through a barter are not includible in the recipient’s income.  First, the Code 
might expressly exclude the received item from being considered income.52  
Second, operational or administrative limits may prevent the government from 
treating an item as within the recipient’s gross income.53  I will discuss each in 
turn. 
1.  Express Exclusion in the Code 
Express exclusions to gross income are found in Code Sections 101 through 
150.  Of these, the express exclusion of gifts from income is the provision that 
could most plausibly be read to exclude property or services received through 
bartering.54  In certain situations, it is possible that a transaction that appears to 
be a barter may really be a gift.  In the landmark case of Commissioner v. 
Duberstein, the United States Supreme Court defined a nontaxable gift as a 
transfer made with “detached and disinterested generosity.”55  One can easily 
                                                 
 45. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429–30 (1955). 
 46. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1 (2009). 
 47. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1). 
 48. I.R.C. § 451(a) (2006). 
 49. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (2009) (emphasis added). 
 50. See Smart Mom’s Babysitting Co-op Startup Kit, supra note 4. 
 51. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006). 
 52. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 102 (2006). 
 53. See Camp, supra note 25, at 21–44 (discussing operational limits). 
 54. I.R.C. § 102(a). 
 55. Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960). 
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imagine a situation in which the neighbor of a single working mother offers to 
babysit while the mother goes to work.  The mother might offer to provide a 
home-cooked meal for the neighbor in exchange.  Assuming the neighbor 
planned to babysit with or without the meal, this is likely a gift rather than a 
taxable exchange because the offer is truly made out of “detached and 
disinterested generosity.”56 
The gift exclusion, however, would not apply to any organized or intentional 
barter transactions.  In the case where a person tells his neighbor, “If you 
babysit my daughter tonight, I will mow your lawn this week,” the gift 
exclusion would not apply.57  There is no “detached and disinterested 
generosity” in such an arrangement.58  Likewise, and perhaps more 
importantly, whenever there is any exchange of points, such as in a babysitting 
co-op or an “Hour Dollars” or “Time Dollars” program, the gift exclusion does 
not apply.59  The parties in such a program are performing services on the 
express and measurable condition of receiving services in return. 
2.  Operational Limits 
Professor Camp correctly notes that, apart from express exclusions from 
income in the Code, there are operational, or administrative, limits that also 
prevent certain items from being included in a recipient’s taxable gross 
income.60  He specifically describes these limits, or exceptions, as income that 
is (1) “priceless,” having “no ascertainable fair market value”; (2) 
“unrealized,” resulting from appreciation in unsold property; and (3) 
“imputed,” “[arising] from self-benefiting activity or the use of self-owned 
property.”61  This description of the operational limits is generally accurate, 
although I disagree with Professor Camp on the applicability of the last of 
these limits to barter transactions. 
Professor Camp first describes the “priceless” concept to mean that even 
though one may be enriched by certain events in his or her life, such as 
“[w]atching one’s daughter tie her shoes for the first time,” those events do not 
produce taxable income because they do not have a fair market value.62  This 
                                                 
 56. See id.  This parallels the “bargain” principle in contract law, stating that a binding 
contract requires “consideration,” which is a negotiated and sought-after item.  See, e.g., Whitten 
v. Greeley-Shaw, 520 A.2d 1307, 1309–10 (Me. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§§ 17, 71 (1981). 
 57. However, the operational limits, discussed infra Part II.A.2, might apply to this 
situation. 
 58. See Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285. 
 59. See I.R.C. § 102(a).  For an excellent analysis of the potential applicability of the gift 
exception to a charitable community-based “Time Dollars” program, see Lindsey, supra note 17, 
at 240.  Professor Lindsey concludes that the gift exception does not apply.  Id.; see also I.R.S. 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-08-009 (Nov. 9, 1995), at 28. 
 60. See Camp, supra note 25, at 21–44. 
 61. Id. at 25. 
 62. Id. at 25–26. 
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particular operational limit does not apply to most barter transactions because 
property or services that are bartered generally will have an ascertainable 
market value.63  There is some dispute as to how to compute the value of 
certain bartered property and services.  Specifically, Professor Robert Keller 
would use the cash price that the recipient would have paid for the item.64  
Professor Joel Newman, on the other hand, would discount that value because 
“participants enter into barter transactions precisely because they are unable to 
sell their goods and services for cash.”65  Despite divergent opinions, however, 
difficulty ascertaining the value of property or a service does not necessarily 
make that property or service priceless.66  
The second exception, “realization,” as an administrative rather than 
constitutional limit,67 generally is associated with the seminal case of 
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Company.68  Professor Camp describes the 
“realization” limit to mean that income is not taxable until an event 
“sufficiently ‘locks in’ an objectively measurable increase in wealth.”69  The 
exchange of services for property or for past, present, or future services is a 
realization event, and the resulting “income” is taxable when the taxpayer has 
the right to receive the property or services.70  Likewise, the exchange of 
property for other property or for services is also a realization event.71  The 
most common modern reasons offered for the realization requirement are (1) 
liquidity concerns; (2) administrative impossibility of annual valuation of 
assets; (3) political impossibility of repealing the realization rules; and (4) 
popular desire to tax capital gains, but not “paper gains.”72   
                                                 
 63. If the bartered property or service did not have any ascertainable value, people would 
not be willing to trade for it. 
 64. Robert I. Keller, The Taxation of Barter Transactions, 67 MINN. L. REV. 441, 451 
(1982–1983). 
 65. Joel S. Newman, Determining Value in Barter Transactions: A Response to Robert 
Keller’s The Taxation of Barter Transactions, 68 MINN. L. REV. 711, 712 (1984). 
 66. See Camp, supra note 25, at 25–28. 
 67. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218–19 (1920) (holding that, as a constitutional 
matter, Congress lacked the power to tax unrealized income).  It is now widely accepted, 
however, that such a constitutional limitation does not exist.  See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, 
INTRODUCTION TO TAXATION 42–43 (5th ed. 2008).  Regardless, the realization requirement 
continues to exist because of administrative concerns. 
 68. 348 U.S. 426, 432–33 (1955); see also Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 
566 (1991) (“[A]n exchange of property gives rise to a realization event so long as the exchanged 
properties . . . embody legally distinct entitlements.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (2009). 
 69. Camp, supra note 25, at 29–30. 
 70. Rev. Rul. 83-163, 1983-2 C.B. 26 (“[S]ervices received in advance for services to be 
rendered in the future is taxable at the time of receipt.”); see also Schlude v. Comm’r, 372 U.S. 
128, 136–37 (1963); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (2009); Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60, at 60–61. 
 71. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (2009); see also I.R.C. § 1001 (2006). 
 72. See Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAX L. REV. 
355, 355–56 (2004).  Professor Schenk’s paper offers a general critique of these four common 
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As mentioned, I disagree with Professor Camp’s application of the imputed-
income limit to barter transactions.73  “Imputed income” has been defined as “a 
flow of satisfactions from durable goods owned and used by the taxpayer, or 
from goods and services arising out of the personal exertions of the taxpayer 
on his own behalf.”74  In other words, imputed income is the value of 
everything that one does for himself.  For example, if a man washes his own 
car and it generally costs $10 to have somebody else wash his car, he 
effectively has been enriched by $10.  It is no different, economically, than if 
he worked an extra hour at his job to earn $10, and then used that $10 to pay to 
have his car washed.  If imputed income were taxable, he would have imputed 
taxable income of $10 when he washed his own car.  Imputed income would 
also include the rental value of property that the taxpayer owns and occupies, 
such as his or her personal residence. 
The Code does not expressly exclude imputed income from gross income, 
but the IRS has never tried to tax it.75  As Professor Camp correctly notes, “the 
sheer volume of small dollar transactions would create an administrative 
nightmare for taxpayers and the IRS alike.”76  The primary issues that the IRS 
would encounter are valuation difficulties77 and administrative intrusiveness 
into people’s lives.78  In addition, “taxing self-provided services (and self-
                                                                                                                 
reasons.  See id.  It is worth noting that additional reasons for a realization limitation on 
determining taxable income, although less common, are often given.  See id. at 350 n.15. 
 73. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 74. Donald B. Marsh, The Taxation of Imputed Income, 58 POL. SCI. Q. 514, 514 (1943).  
This definition is not without controversy, however.  Professor Joseph Dodge correctly notes: 
     The term “imputed income” as used in the tax literature is not entirely without 
ambiguity.  The principal meanings, which overlap somewhat, appear to be: (1) the 
flow of satisfactions obtained by a taxpayer (which would include not only the value of 
satisfactions derived from owning and spending but also the value of leisure, sleep, a 
happy marriage, etc.), and (2) the market-price equivalents of non-market economic 
activity (such as the value of self-grown crops and the rental value of self-owned assets, 
and possibly the value of self-performed services). . . .  The second definition is more 
useful because it focuses on a particular kind of “economic benefit,” namely, the 
hypothetical, cash income that would be obtained if the person, contrary to fact, entered 
the market and sold or rented her services, self-created goods, or self-owned assets. 
Joseph M. Dodge, Accessions to Wealth, Realization of Gross Income, and Dominion and 
Control: Applying the “Claim of Right Doctrine” to Found Objects, Including Record-Setting 
Baseballs, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 685, 691–92 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
 75. See Morris v. Comm’r, 9 B.T.A. 1273, 1278 (1928) (“If products of a farm consumed 
thereon are income to the producer, it would seem to follow that the rental value of the farmer’s 
home, the gratuitous services of his wife and children, and the value of the power derived from 
draft animals owned by the farmer and used without cost should also be considered.  It is obvious 
that such items are comparable to the rental value of a private residence, which has never been 
regarded as income or as a factor in the determination of tax liability.”). 
 76. Camp, supra note 25, at 38. 
 77. Imputed value is not “priceless,” but it is difficult to determine. 
 78. Camp, supra note 25, at 41–42. 
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created personal use assets) would tend to be regressive, because these 
activities are more likely to be engaged in by low-income groups.”79 
Professor Camp states that although the IRS has expressly ruled that 
commercial barter transactions are taxable to the bartering parties,80 it “has 
refused to extend the Revenue Ruling to bartering arrangements involving ‘the 
informal exchange of similar services on a noncommercial basis’ where there 
is no ‘creation of contractual rights and obligations among members.’”81  I 
respectfully disagree with Professor Camp’s characterization of the IRS’s 
inaction as a refusal.  He quotes from Private Letter Ruling 96-08-009 in 
support of this statement, but I believe that ruling is unhelpful for two reasons: 
first, the Revenue Ruling is not limited on its face to “commercial” 
transactions;82 second, perhaps more importantly, the Private Letter Ruling 
does not involve the taxation of the bartering parties and it does not discuss 
whether they will be taxed.83 Instead, the Private Letter Ruling involves the 
characteristics of a barter-exchange company involved in a Time Dollar 
program.84  As mentioned, this is an altogether different issue.  Very 
significantly, the Private Letter Ruling specifically states: “No opinion is 
expressed about the tax consequences of the program under any [provision of 
the Code other than Section 6045, which deals with reporting requirements for 
brokers].  Specifically, no opinion is expressed concerning whether a member 
earns income as a result of the member’s participation in the program.”85  
Professor Camp asserts that when taxpayers swap the same services, say in a 
babysitting co-op or a carpool arrangement, it is no different from performing 
those services for themselves.86  Thus, he would argue, such barters are not 
taxable because they are “simply enhanced self-created benefits,” subject to the 
same “valuation and administrative intrusiveness” concerns as standard 
imputed income.87 
Professor Camp’s arguments are excellent from a broad policy standpoint, 
but they are based on his own extension of the imputed-income concept to the 
bartering of identical services.  To my knowledge, they are not founded on any 
                                                 
 79. Dodge, supra note 74, at 702. 
 80. Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60, at 60–61. 
 81. Camp, supra note 25, at 41 (quoting I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-08-009 (Nov. 9, 1995)). 
 82. Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60, at 60–61.  Although the two examples used in the 
ruling happened to be commercial transactions, the ruling does not indicate one way or another 
whether it applies to noncommercial transactions.  Id. 
 83. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-08-009 (Nov. 9, 1995). 
 84. Id.  Although, with the Private Letter Ruling the IRS did not expressly extend Revenue 
Ruling 79-24 to apply to noncommercial transactions, by stating that it has “refused to extend” 
the ruling, Camp, supra note 25, at 41, Professor Camp makes it sound as if the IRS was asked to 
extend and said “no.”  The Private Letter Ruling simply has nothing to do with the taxation of the 
bartering parties, whether commercial or noncommercial. 
 85. I.R.C. § 6045 (2009); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-08-009, at 3. 
 86. Camp, supra note 25, at 42. 
 87. Id. 
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IRS ruling or on any binding authority.  Although I would make his arguments 
if my client were being audited, I would not advise a client that formalized 
swaps of identical services, such as in a babysitting co-op or a carpool 
arrangement, do not produce taxable income. 
Assuming arguendo that Professor Camp is correct when he extends the 
imputed-income concept to noncommercial bartering, it is critical to note that 
he only extends it to exchanges of identical services.88  Many barter 
transactions, whether formal or informal, involve exchanges of property or 
exchanges of different services rather than simple exchanges of identical 
services.  For example, in the “utopian commune” of Twin Oaks in central 
Virginia, community members do what they are good at; in return they receive 
work credit for their labor, which allows them to purchase services from other 
members who are also doing what they are good at.89  Less dramatically, it is 
common for people to informally exchange personal property.  Professor 
Adam Chodorow has produced a useful discussion of the imputed-income 
issue using informal personal-property exchanges as an example.  In his 
example, there exist two neighbors, one who grows tomatoes, the other 
squash.90  Accepting the premise that the grown, unsold crops are nontaxable 
imputed income, Professor Chodorow explains that “[a]s soon as the growers 
sell the produce, . . . they have entered the market and have received value for 
their services, goods, or both.”91  The reason for this is simple; at the point of 
sale, the policy rationale for exempting from tax the imputed income 
dissolves.92  The growers have received real income and, consequently, must 
pay tax on the sale.93 
Professor Chodorow continues:  
Similarly, if the neighbors trade tomatoes for squash, they will be 
subject to tax, based on the fair market value of the produce each 
receives.  Simply exchanging imputed income in one’s hands for 
imputed income in another’s hands does not convert the gain into 
imputed income.  Rather, by engaging in barter, people have entered 
the market, received real income, and under current tax law must be 
subject to taxation.94 
This tax issue also arises in the context of charitable programs such as “Hour 
Dollars” and “Time Dollars.”  In these self-help, community-based programs 
sponsored by nonprofit community organizations, “[e]ach hour of service 
                                                 
 88. Id. 
 89. Miriam Sagan, Bountiful Harvest, SAGE: ALBUQUERQUE J. MONTHLY MAG. FOR 
WOMEN, Sept. 2008, at 7. 
 90. Adam S. Chodorow, Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Virtual Income, 75 TENN. L. 
REV. 695, 728 (2008). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (emphasis added). 
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provided . . . entitles the participant to receive one [hour of credit for another 
person’s services].”95  The driving principle behind these programs, which are 
often supported by grants from charitable foundations, is community 
reciprocity.96  The imputed-income exclusion does not apply to bartering that 
occurs through these programs because, as Professor Vada Waters Lindsey has 
correctly noted, when “a Time Dollars volunteer can expect to receive tangible 
benefits in the form of services or property upon providing services or property 
to other participants the rationale supporting the imputed income exclusion 
does not apply.”97 
In short, I believe that true barter transactions,98 whether formal or informal, 
generally are taxable under current law.  However, the IRS does not routinely 
or uniformly enforce the taxation requirement on these transactions.99  Further, 
although creative arguments can be made for exempting these transactions 
from the current law when the services exchanged are identical,100 to my 
knowledge these arguments have never been accepted by any court or IRS 
ruling.  There certainly are good policy arguments for not taxing most 
noncommercial barter transactions, but these arguments are not reflected in the 
current state of the law; rather, they describe why the law should be changed.  
The foremost policy argument is the “ability to pay.” 
B.  Ability to Pay 
There is a widespread belief that our tax system embodies the notion that 
taxes should be assessed in accordance with each taxpayer’s “ability to pay.”101  
Despite this highly appealing and apparently simple philosophy, “[o]pinions 
differ crucially as to the best measure of ability to pay.”102  This difficulty is 
nothing new.  As Professor Alfred G. Buehler said in the 1940s, “[l]ike such 
popular slogans as ‘social security’ and ‘full employment,’ [the term ‘ability to 
pay’] suggests a program of action with sufficient vagueness that almost 
everyone, if he can define the term in his own language, will feel that he can 
                                                 
 95. See Lindsey, supra note 17, at 229 for a general description of one Time Dollars 
program. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. By “true barter transactions,” I am referring to exchanges that do not involve a gift 
component.  These are exchanges in which both parties enter the exchange only because each is 
receiving a quid pro quo for his goods or services. 
 99. Camp, supra note 25, at 32–33. 
 100. See supra notes 73–87 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Camp’s imputed 
income argument). 
 101. See Stephen Utz, Ability to Pay, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 867, 867–68 (2002). 
 102. Id. at 869. 
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endorse it.”103  The crux of the issue regarding “ability to pay” is tied to the 
concept of liquidity.104  Does the taxpayer have cash to pay taxes?105 
The phrase “ability to pay,” although used in tax discussions for hundreds of 
years,106 was popularized by the prominent tax law scholar, E.R.A. Seligman 
of Columbia University.107  Professor Seligman viewed the income tax as the 
culmination of American society’s “broad demand for tax justice,” and “ability 
to pay” as the “touchstone of enlightened tax policy.”108  Although Professor 
Seligman did not view income as the only measure of ability to pay,109 he 
thought it was “a desirable tax base because it [could] easily be measured.”110  
Unfortunately, the definition of “income” itself is subject to much variation. 
Our current tax law generally accepts the Haig-Simons denotation of 
individual income (“Haig-Simons concept” or “Schanz-Haig-Simmons 
concept”), which is the sum of a person’s accumulation and consumption over 
a given period of time.111  This definition is notable because it does not 
consider whether the taxpayer has cash to pay taxes.  Professor Joseph Dodge 
rejects a cash-based approach to measuring income, arguing that “the dominant 
paradigm is ‘changes in wealth.’”112  This is correct.  Taxes are imposed in 
many situations in which taxpayers do not have cash, such as taxes on treasure 
troves and property swaps.113  Notwithstanding the fact that the prevailing 
definition of income for federal income tax purposes does not consider a 
taxpayer’s liquidity, many people equate the concept of “income” with cash 
receipts,114 and sometimes taxes are exempted or deferred because of 
                                                 
 103. Alfred G. Buehler, Ability to Pay, 1 TAX L. REV. 243, 243 (1945). 
 104. See id. 
 105. Chodorow, supra note 90, at 738.  Professor Chodorow has said, “Liquidity concerns 
are simply a weak form of the concern regarding a taxpayer’s ability to pay.”  Id. 
 106. Buehler, supra note 103, at 243. 
 107. See Utz, supra note 101, at 911. 
 108. Id. at 912. 
 109. Id. at 913.  (“[Seligman] acknowledges that equal amounts of money revenue or the 
equivalent may not necessarily reflect equal ability to pay, because of difference in ‘social 
demands,’ philanthropic impulse, family needs, and so forth.”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Specifically, Henry Simons, a University of Chicago economist, advanced the following 
definition of “personal income” in 1938: “Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum 
of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the 
store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question.”  HENRY C. 
SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).  Robert Haig and George Schanz had already 
advocated this basic idea and, thus, their names are often included in the shorthand for concept.  
See JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 37–
38 (3d ed. 2004).  It is worth noting that Simons rejected the “ability to pay” tradition.  Utz, supra 
note 101, at 915. 
 112. Dodge, supra note 74, at 690–91. 
 113. See Schenk, supra note 72, at 361. 
 114. Professors Zelenak and McMahon have said that the income tax is “all about” the 
receipt of cash.  Lawrence A. Zelenak & Martin McMahon, Jr., Taxing Baseballs and Other 
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legitimate liquidity concerns.115  In sum, liquidity is generally not considered 
when determining a taxpayer’s taxable income, although there are a few 
limited exceptions to this rule.116 
These exceptions are rooted in practical concerns, including valuation 
difficulties117 and liquidity issues.118  These concerns are legitimate and valid 
reasons for deviating from the Haig-Simons “norm.”119  As Professor Dodge 
has correctly said, 
     [A]ccommodation to practical considerations should not be 
viewed as a “retreat” from “principle,” but rather as a “shift” to a 
different kind of principle, namely, a “legal” (as opposed to 
“economic” or “fairness”) principle.  Legal issues that are relevant to 
the present discussion include: (1) whether or not rules that can 
rarely be enforced, or which are enforced at the whim of officials, are 
“rules” worth having, and (2) whether various distinctions among tax 
categories are coherent and intelligible.  Admitting legal norms into 
tax policy debates should not be a cause for embarrassment.120 
I submit that barter transactions, except to the extent that the bartering is in 
connection with a taxpayer’s trade or business, fall into Professor Dodge’s first 
category.  Specifically, other than barter through barter-exchange companies, 
the current rules regarding taxation of barter transactions “can rarely be 
enforced” and they have the potential to be “enforced at the whim of 
[government] officials.”121  This arbitrariness problem, combined with 
liquidity concerns, makes for a terrible tax law governing the treatment of 
barter transactions.  Similarly, Professor Camp observed the following 
                                                                                                                 
Found Property, 84 TAX NOTES 1299, 1304–05 (1999).  With respect to taxing virtual income, 
Professor Chodorow argues “that the ability to pay is a function of a taxpayer’s ability to cash 
out.”  Chodorow, supra note 90, at 736. 
 115. See Schenk, supra note 72, at 363–64.  For example, Congress has decided “not [to] 
tax[] a family farm until [it is] transferred outside the family,” which “can be explained as a 
response to legitimate liquidity concerns.”  Id.  As Professor Chodorow has recognized: 
[O]ne of the justifications offered for retaining the realization requirement is that taxing 
unrealized appreciation may lead to taxpayer liquidity issues and difficulties in paying 
taxes due on such appreciation.  Liquidity concerns are also one of the justifications 
offered for not taxing the receipt of gifts and inheritances.  Thus, even though property 
appreciation and the receipt of gifts or an inheritance clearly constitute measurable 
accessions to wealth, and are therefore income under that formulation, we nonetheless 
exclude them from the tax base. 
Chodorow, supra note 90, at 738 (footnotes omitted). 
 116. See Schenk, supra note 72, at 363–64. 
 117. See Bradley T. Borden, The Like-Kind Exchange Equity Conundrum, 60 FLA. L. REV. 
643, 661 (2008).  This is commonly used as a justification for the exclusion of imputed income.  
See supra text accompanying notes 75–78. 
 118. See Dodge, supra note 74, at 693. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 121. Id. 
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regarding our tax system in general: “This system will break down when it 
demands taxpayers report income that is unreportable, pay tax on ‘phantom’ 
income which has produced no means of payment, or makes suckers out of 
compliant taxpayers by imposing requirements that are practically 
unenforceable against noncompliant taxpayers.”122  The current taxation of 
barter transactions fits this description perfectly because the income from 
barter transactions is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain, and because 
private barter transactions are virtually undetectable by law enforcement.123  In 
addition, because the current law is so difficult to enforce, it is not only subject 
to enforceability problems on the government’s end, but also to serious abuse 
by taxpayers. 
C.  Potential Abuse by Taxpayers  
A married couple or a single person with “earned income” and at least two 
qualifying children could claim a maximum Earned Income Credit (EIC) of 
$4,824 for taxable years beginning in 2008.124  The EIC is a “refundable 
credit,” which indicates that the person claiming the credit can get money from 
the government even if he or she does not pay any taxes.125  The meaning of 
“earned income” is the same both for determining whether an individual 
taxpayer qualifies for the credit and for assessing the phaseout of the credit.126  
“Earned income” specifically includes the following three types of income:  
1. Wages, salaries, tips, and other taxable employee pay.  Employee 
pay is earned income only if it is taxable.  Nontaxable employee pay, 
such as certain dependent care benefits and adoption benefits, is not 
                                                 
 122. Camp, supra note 25, at 22–23. 
 123. Cf. id. at 33 (describing the IRS’s response to complex bartering and bartering clubs). 
 124. Rev. Proc. 2007-66, 2007-2 C.B. 970.  These are figures for use in preparing 2008 
individual income tax returns for people having two or more qualifying children.  To claim the 
maximum EIC, the married couple must have earned income for the year falling in the range of 
$12,060 to $18,740, and the single person must have earned income for the year falling in the 
range of $12,050 to $15,750.  Id.  To claim the EIC, the couple or person must meet all the other 
EIC requirements found in I.R.C. § 32.  Specifically, anybody claiming the credit for tax year 
2008 (1) must have a valid Social Security Number, (2) cannot be filing as “married filing 
separately,” (3) must be a U.S. citizen or a resident alien all year, (4) cannot file Form 255 or 
Form 2555-EZ for foreign earned income, (5) must have investment income of no more than 
$2,950, and (6) must have income that qualifies as “earned income.”  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
IRS, PUBLICATION 596: EARNED INCOME CREDIT (EIC) FOR USE IN PREPARING 2008 RETURNS 1 
(2009), available at http://unclefed.com/Tax-News/2009/p596.pdf [hereinafter 2008 IRS 
PUBLICATION 596].  See generally I.R.C. § 32 (2006).  Although the EIC is available for people 
without children, the amounts are drastically smaller without at least one qualifying child.  See, 
e.g., Rev. Proc. 2007-66, 2007-2 C.B. 970 (listing a maximum amount of $4,824 for two or more 
qualifying children, and $438 for no qualifying children).  For information regarding who is a 
“qualifying child,” see 2008 IRS PUBLICATION 596, supra, at 12–20 (giving rules for and 
providing examples of qualifying children). 
 125. See POPKIN, supra note 67, at 20–21. 
 126. See I.R.C. § 32(a), (c)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.32-2(c)(2) (2009). 
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earned income.  But there is an exception for nontaxable combat pay, 
which [a taxpayer] can choose to include in earned income . . . . 
2. Net earnings from self-employment. 
3. Gross income received as a statutory employee.127 
“Earned income” does not “include interest and dividends, pensions and 
annuities, social security and railroad retirement benefits (including disability 
benefits), alimony and child support, welfare benefits, workers’ compensation 
benefits, unemployment compensation, . . . nontaxable foster care payments, 
and veterans’ benefits.”128  In addition, “[n]ontaxable workfare payments are 
not earned income” for EIC purposes.129  Workfare payments are defined as 
“cash payments . . . receive[d] from a state or local agency that administers 
public assistance programs funded under the federal Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) program in return for certain work activities such as 
(1) work experience activities . . . or (2) community service program 
activities.”130 
The IRS has identified significant government overpayments of the EIC to 
taxpayers.131  Although it is impossible to know whether noncompliance is due 
to fraud or inadvertent error, the noncompliance rate was roughly twenty-seven 
to thirty-two percent for Tax Year 1999.132  If a taxpayer receives an 
overpayment of the EIC, resulting in an underpayment of his taxes, the IRS has 
the power to impose a twenty percent penalty if the underpayment was a 
product of negligence or disregard of the rules,133 and a seventy-five percent 
penalty for underpayment due to fraud.134  In addition, if an EIC claim is 
deemed improper because of “intentional disregard of the rules,” the IRS may 
disallow future EIC claims for two years.135  If the EIC claim is deemed 
improper, because of fraud, the IRS may disallow future EIC claims for ten 
years.136 
                                                 
 127. 2008 IRS PUBLICATION 596, supra note 124, at 9.  Net earnings from self-employment 
are determined with regard to the self-employment tax deduction (that is, one-half of the amount 
of self-employment taxes may be deducted).  CCH EDITORIAL STAFF, 2010 U.S. MASTER TAX 
GUIDE 480 (2009). 
 128. 2008 IRS PUBLICATION 596, supra note 124, at 11. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. (emphasis added). 
 131. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, IRS, COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES FOR EARNED INCOME 
TAX CREDIT CLAIMED ON 1999 RETURNS 10–12 (2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/compeitc.pdf; see also POPKIN, supra note 67, at 22 (“There have been considerable 
compliance problems associated with the earned income credit.”). 
 132. See Stephen D. Holt, Keeping it in Context: Earned Income Tax Credit Compliance and 
Treatment of the Working Poor, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 183, 185 (2007). 
 133. I.R.C. § 6662(a), (b) (2006). 
 134. I.R.C. § 6663(a) (2006). 
 135. I.R.C. § 32(k)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 136. Id. § 32(k)(1)(B)(i). 
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As mentioned, bartered property and services can result in self-employment 
income, as though the taxpayer had received cash.137  Thus, in the case of an 
unemployed or underemployed individual or married couple, it would be 
tempting to barter “services,” report the income as self-employment income, 
and claim the EIC.138   
For example, suppose an unemployed married couple with two minor 
children has no income other than welfare or veterans benefits.139  Also 
suppose this couple lives next door to another couple in the same financial 
situation.  Assuming the two families are close friends, they might agree to 
exchange a wide variety of “services” solely to reach the minimum amount of 
earned income necessary to qualify for the maximum EIC.  For example, they 
might exchange watching each others’ homes for burglars, mowing lawns, 
cooking, cleaning, playing the guitar for each other, transporting children to 
school, babysitting, or any number of difficult-to-value and difficult-to-track 
activities.  With minimal planning, the two families could set the value of their 
respective “services” at $12,050 for the year, allowing each to claim the 
maximum EIC. 
If the two families execute the described plan, each family would report self-
employment income of $12,050, even though neither exchanged a penny of 
cash nor made any significant efforts; each merely did for its neighbor what it 
normally does for itself.140  In this situation, each family would pay self-
employment taxes of $1,702.61.141  Considering each would be eligible to 
receive, at a minimum, the standard deduction,142 personal exemptions,143 and 
the deduction for one-half of the self-employment tax paid,144 the two families 
are unlikely to owe any income taxes.  Each will qualify for the maximum EIC 
of $4,824145 at a cost of $1,702.61 in self-employment taxes.146  This yields a 
                                                 
 137. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 138. For an excellent discussion of the technique, see Lindsey, supra note 17, 233–34. 
 139. Welfare and veterans benefits do not count as “earned income” for EIC purposes.  See 
supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 140. This circumvention of the tax code arguably has its benefits because it brings 
communities together, but it certainly conflicts with the purpose of the EIC.  See infra note 148 
and accompanying text. 
 141. $12,050 multiplied by 0.9235, multiplied by 0.153, equals $1,702.61.  This calculation 
is based on 2008 figures.  See I.R.C. § 1402 (2006); DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, IRS, OMB NO. 
1545-0074, Schedule SE, at lines 4–5 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f 
1040sse.pdf [hereinafter Schedule SE]. 
 142. The 2008 standard deduction for a married couple filing a joint return was $10,900.  
I.R.C. § 63(c) (2006); Rev. Proc. 2007-66, 2007-45 I.R.B. 970, 974. 
 143. In 2008, personal exemptions were $3,500 per family member.  I.R.C. § 151(d) (2006); 
Rev. Proc. 2007-66, 2007-45 I.R.B. 970, 975. 
 144. This deduction is $851.31 and is calculated by dividing $1,702.61 by two.  See Schedule 
SE, supra note 141, at line 6. 
 145. See 2008 IRS PUBLICATION 596, supra note 124, at 44–47. 
 146. This has the added benefit of giving the families credit for purposes of Social Security 
and Medicare. 
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net gain of $3,121.39 per family147 for the year for doing nothing materially 
different, with respect to personal effort, than it would have done with no 
planning.  This technique thus appears to thwart one of the key purposes of the 
EIC—providing work incentives for low-income families.148   
The above hypothetical raises two immediate questions.  First, are the 
families committing tax fraud?  Provided that they are actually bartering 
services, even though they could have performed the services for themselves 
without any bartering, they should be able to legitimately carry out the plan.  
As Judge Learned Hand famously said, “Any one may so arrange his affairs 
that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern 
that will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase 
one’s taxes.”149  Presumably, this same logic would extend to arranging one’s 
affairs to qualify for a refundable tax credit. 
Second, how will low-income taxpayers discover this technique?  In all 
likelihood, the information will come from Refund Anticipation Loan (RAL) 
providers.  RAL providers tend to be located primarily in low-income 
neighborhoods and have a disproportionately high number of clients who 
receive the EIC.150  Return preparation by RAL providers is often linked to 
“purchases at rent-to-own furniture and appliance stores, car dealers, and other 
retail outlets.”151  Thus, it is not difficult to imagine that RAL providers might 
suggest to unemployed potential clients that they could swap services with a 
friend, neighbor, or family member, or provide services through a service-
exchange organization, such as a “Time Dollars” program, and essentially 
receive free money.152  The RAL provider would have no incentive to 
determine if an actual barter really occurred, and would likely keep the bulk of 
the EIC refund.  Creating an incentive scheme that makes RAL providers the 
                                                 
 147. This figure is calculated by subtracting $1,702.61 from $4,824.00. 
 148. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, VOL. 2, at 15 
(1984); Jonathan Barry Forman, Improving the Earned Income Credit: Transition to a Wage 
Subsidy Credit for the Working Poor, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 41, 55 (1988). 
 149. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934). 
 150. Only seventeen percent of taxpayers are EIC recipients, but fifty-six percent of all RAL 
borrowers are EIC recipients.  CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. & NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., INC., 
REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS: UPDATED FACTS & FIGURES 2 (2006), available at http://www. 
consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/main/RAL_2006_Early_info.pdf; see also 
ALAN BERUBE ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INST. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, THE PRICE OF PAYING 
TAXES: HOW TAX PREPARATION AND REFUND LOAN FEES ERODE THE BENEFITS OF THE EITC 
9–11 (2002); CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. & NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., INC., 2005 REFUND 
ANTICIPATION LOAN REPORT: PICKING TAXPAYERS’ POCKETS, DRAINING TAX RELIEF 
DOLLARS: REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS STILL SLICING INTO LOW-INCOME AMERICANS’ 
HARD-EARNED TAX REFUNDS 8–16 (2005). 
 151. See Holt, supra note 132, at 201. 
 152. See Lindsey, supra note 17, at 233. 
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primary beneficiaries of an EIC “refund” is completely inconsistent with the 
policy aims of the EIC.153 
III.  REPORTING DUTY 
A.  Rule 
In the 1970s, barter exchange-companies began to widely market themselves 
as a means by which businesses could avoid paying income taxes.154  Faced 
with widespread tax evasion and lost revenue, Congress understandably 
responded by changing the Code to require barter-exchange companies to 
report exchanges.155  Although this did not alter the fact that all bartering is 
generally taxable, it provided a means for the IRS to force people who used 
barter-exchange companies to pay taxes.  As a result of the reporting 
requirement, legitimate barter-exchange companies now inform their clients 
that bartering is taxable.156 
As mentioned, people commonly confuse the rules on the tax effect of 
bartering between two bartering parties with the reporting requirements 
applicable to barter-exchange companies.157  In general, the Code requires 
“[e]very person doing business as a broker” to make a return, in accordance 
with the Treasury Regulations, showing the name and address of each 
customer, as well as details regarding gross proceeds and any other 
information the Secretary of the Treasury may require.158  The Code 
specifically provides that the term “broker” includes a barter-exchange 
company.159  It defines a “barter-exchange company” as “any organization of 
members providing property or services who jointly contract to trade or barter 
such property or services.”160 
In slightly more detailed language, the Treasury Regulations define a barter-
exchange company161 as “any person with members or clients that contract 
either with each other or with such person to trade or barter property or 
                                                 
 153. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 154. See infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 155. See I.R.C. § 6045 (2006). 
 156. See, e.g., Barter Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 14.  Note, however, that many 
companies, quite possibly in good faith, erroneously report that bartering in a noncommercial 
context is not taxable.  See id. 
 157. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 158. I.R.C. § 6045(a) (2006). 
 159. Id. § 6045(c)(1)(B).  The Code actually uses the term “barter exchange” here to refer to 
what I prefer to call a “barter-exchange company.”  Id.  I add the word “company” because a 
“barter exchange” could also refer to the transaction itself, not just the facilitator of the 
transaction. 
 160. Id. § 6045(c)(3). 
 161. The Treasury Regulations uses the term “barter exchange,” not “barter-exchange 
company.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(a)(4) (2009). 
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services either directly or through such person.”162  Excluded from this 
definition are “arrangements that provide solely for the informal exchange of 
similar services on a noncommercial basis.”163 
In a Private Letter Ruling, the IRS addressed the issue of whether “a 
nonprofit organization that . . . supervises a community self-help program” is a 
barter-exchange company.164  The IRS carefully noted that volunteers in the 
program provided services, such as housekeeping, babysitting, and house 
painting, on an entirely voluntary basis, “with no contractual obligations 
incurred.”165  The taxpayers “plann[ed] to establish computerized records of 
services provided and received through the program.”166  As part of the 
program, participants earned credits, which had no monetary value, but instead 
“serve[d] merely as a means to motivate volunteers.”167  Ultimately, the IRS 
concluded that the nonprofit was not a barter-exchange company.168  In short, 
this meant that the nonprofit was not required to report the barter exchanges it 
facilitated.169  However, the ruling said nothing whatsoever about whether 
participants had a duty to include services received through the program as 
income.170 
More recently, in a separate Private Letter Ruling, the IRS addressed 
whether a nonprofit corporation that sponsored a “Time Dollar” program was a 
barter-exchange company.171  The IRS noted that “[t]he purpose of the 
program [was] to strengthen the community and to increase access to services 
and resources for all in the community.”172  Under the program, “[a]ll services 
[were] valued equally” and participants “commonly [provided] services such 
as housekeeping, babysitting, gardening, and errand running” in exchange for 
points, which the program managed.173  The IRS concluded that this particular 
nonprofit corporation was not a barter-exchange company because its 
“operations [provided] a means for the informal exchange of similar services 
on a noncommercial basis and [did] not result in the creation of contractual 
rights and obligations among members (or between members and [the 
nonprofit corporation]) for the exchange of property or services.”174  The IRS 
                                                 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-36-060 (June 12, 1985). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. (defining the reporting requirement under § 6045(a) and finding that the taxpayer 
is not a barter-exchange company). 
 170. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 6045 (2006). 
 171. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-08-009 (Nov. 9, 1995), at 27. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 28. 
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concludes its analysis by making clear that it has made no determination 
“whether a member earns income as a result of the member’s participation in 
the program.”175 
These Private Letter Rulings are important not only because they clarify the 
common misconception that the two parties to a barter transaction are subject 
to the same rules as a barter-exchange company, but also because they provide 
some insight into what the IRS deems taxable.  By requiring barter-exchange 
companies to report only those barter transactions that occur in the commercial 
context and create “contractual obligations,” the IRS appears to accept the fact 
that the vast majority of noncommercial, noncontractually enforceable barter 
transactions will go unreported.176  However, the IRS did not go so far as to 
say that those barter transactions are not taxable. 
B.  Commercial and Contractually Enforceable 
Information on the IRS’s website also emphasizes that a facilitator of barter 
transactions is a barter-exchange company with a reporting duty if (1) the 
arrangement is commercial and (2) it creates a binding contract.177  
Presumably, this “simple” rule is meant to clarify the law for taxpayers and 
create a standard that the IRS can readily enforce.  However, it fails to do this. 
The question, then, is: what does it mean to engage in a barter transaction on 
a commercial, as opposed to noncommercial, basis?  The law is not clear.  
Presumably, if membership in a formal bartering group requires a membership 
fee, any barter transactions between members of the group would be 
considered “commercial,” regardless of what the barterers are trading.  The 
question is more difficult, however, when no monetary membership fee is 
required to join the barter group.  For example, money is usually not required 
to join a babysitting co-op or a carpool group.178  Does this automatically mean 
that those arrangements are noncommercial?  The IRS’s rulings do not provide 
a simple blanket rule.  For example, the IRS has stated that barter-exchange 
companies “do[] not include arrangements that provide solely for the informal 
exchange of similar services on a noncommercial basis.”179  That the IRS 
would qualify “exchange of similar services” with “on a noncommercial basis” 
implies that the IRS foresees “informal” barter transactions where the parties 
“exchange similar services” on a commercial basis.  Thus, that the IRS has 
declined to provide a bright-line rule, but has chosen to provide an extremely 
vague one, suggests that it is possible to have a “commercial” arrangement 
even where no monetary fees are required. 
                                                 
 175. Id. 
 176. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-08-009 (Nov. 9, 1995) (“No opinion is expressed 
concerning whether a member earns income as a result of the member’s participation in the 
program.”); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-36-060 (June 12, 1985). 
 177. See Bartering Tax Center, supra note 24; see also supra text accompanying note 24. 
 178. See, e.g., Smart Mom’s Babysitting Co-Op Startup Kit, supra note 4. 
 179. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-08-009 (Nov. 9, 1995), at 28. 
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Dictionaries do not provide much help, given their broad definition of the 
word “commercial.”  Webster’s Dictionary, for example, contains many 
definitions for “commercial,” including the following: “made or done 
primarily for sale or profit.”180  Are carpool groups or babysitting co-ops 
“made or done primarily for sale or profit”?  Assuming “profit” includes 
receiving something of value in exchange for services, then carpool groups and 
babysitting co-ops involve “commercial” barter transactions, which would 
yield taxable income.  Then again, this would describe virtually all barter 
transactions, including a “Time Dollars” program, which the IRS held did not 
involve a taxable barter-exchange company.181  In short, under current law, it is 
extremely difficult to determine whether many types of arrangements are 
“commercial” or “noncommercial.” 
The creation of contractual rights and obligations is, perhaps, an even more 
difficult issue.  Many cases deal with the issue of when exchanged promises 
create a binding contract.182  However, as the Minnesota Supreme Court said in 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., a contract generally “consists of an offer, an 
acceptance, and consideration. . . .  [H]owever, the matter is not this 
simple.”183  The question, then, for purposes of determining whether a barter 
transaction yields taxable income, is: do the exchanged promises create a 
“legal obligation,” which the law will enforce, or merely a “moral and ethical 
obligation,” which the law will generally not enforce?184  Complicating the 
matter, a reasonable person in the offeree’s shoes must have believed that the 
offeror sought to enter into a binding legal contract.185  In the case of a 
babysitting cooperative, for example, the answer is not entirely clear.  Do 
“reasonable” members of a babysitting co-op believe that they have the right to 
sue if they accumulate babysitting points and the other members refuse to 
perform?  The answer is unclear.  It is a fact-sensitive question that depends, 
                                                 
 180. WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 411 (2003). 
 181. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-36-060 (June 12, 1985). 
 182. See, e.g., James v. McDonald’s Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 677–78 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing 
whether a participant in a contest agreed to an arbitration clause in the contest’s “Official Rules”); 
Pierce v. Clarion Ledger, 452 F. Supp. 2d 661, 663–64 (S.D. Miss. 2006), aff’d, 236 F. App’x 
887 (5th Cir. 2007) (discussing reporter-source promise-based contractual obligations); Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990), rev’d, 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (discussing 
contractual obligations that arise from a reporter’s promise to maintain a source’s anonymity); 
Kabil Devs. Corp. v. Mignot, 566 P.2d 505, 506–07 (Or. 1977) (discussing whether an 
enforceable contract may be based on “subjective intentions and expectations rather than on the 
objective manifestations of mutual assent”); Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 518 (Va. 1954) 
(same). 
 183. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 202. 
 184. See id. at 203. 
 185. See Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 521. 
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among other things, on the nature of the relationship among the members and 
the formality of the arrangement.186 
IV.  MY PROPOSAL  
A.  Overview  
The goal behind this proposal is to design a way to allow communities, 
including online communities, to exchange certain property and services 
without being constrained by the tax consequences of their actions.187  
Although current tax laws in this area are rarely enforced, people justifiably 
fear that an IRS agent may arbitrarily enforce the law, or the law may be used 
for political gain.188  In short, this proposal attempts to provide taxpayers with 
clarity and a lower risk of government abuse.  However, these advantages must 
be balanced against the fact that people will use bartering to avoid taxes if 
given the opportunity to do so. 
The only way to provide clarity, while ensuring that people are treated fairly 
and do not use bartering to evade taxes, is for Congress to amend the Code to 
expressly exempt certain bartering activities from federal income taxes.189  
These activities should be divided into the following two classes: (1) the 
exchange of services and (2) the exchange of property.  When looking at the 
exchange from a tax perspective, it is important to analyze each party to the 
barter transaction separately to determine exactly what that person is 
exchanging.190  For clarity, I will use the terms “Barterer A” and “Barterer B” 
to refer to two parties to a hypothetical barter transaction.   
B.  Exchange of Services  
1.  In General 
If Barterer A exchanges his services for Barterer B’s services, I propose that 
the services that Barterer A receives be expressly excluded from his gross 
income, unless the services that Barterer A performs qualify as his “trade or 
business.”  If Barterer A’s services qualify as his “trade or business,” then the 
fair market value of any services that Barterer A receives in exchange should 
immediately be includable in Barterer A’s gross income. 
                                                 
 186. My inclination is that most arrangements of this type do not create binding contracts, but 
the answer is far from clear. 
 187. Revenue loss from adopting this proposal should be relatively small because there is 
little enforcement now against taxpayers who barter outside the context of a barter-exchange 
company.  See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 189. The term “federal income taxes” is used broadly and loosely here to include all federal 
taxes that may be owed directly as a result of earning an income.  The term would include, for 
example, Social Security and self-employment taxes. 
 190. This is particularly true when the barter involves a combination of goods and services. 
810 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 59:785 
If Barterer A exchanges his services for Barterer B’s property, I propose that 
Barterer A take that property with an income tax basis of zero unless the 
services that Barterer A performs qualify as his “trade or business.”  If the 
services performed by Barterer A qualify as his “trade or business,” then he 
should immediately include, as part of his gross income, the fair market value 
of any property that he receives in exchange for those services.191 
Congress should codify these changes to the law with a new Code section.192  
The term “trade or business” should be interpreted expansively to include the 
possibility of defining the repeated exchange of a particular service as a new 
trade or business. 
2.  Trade or Business 
The term “trade or business” has appeared in more than fifty sections and 
eight-hundred subsections of the Code and in hundreds of places in the 
Treasury Regulations.193  Despite this, neither the Code nor the Treasury 
Regulations provide a general definition of “trade or business.”194  As a result, 
it is possible to have a trade or business for certain purposes, but not others.  
For example, the Code explains that “the performance of personal services 
within the United States at any time within the taxable year” generally will 
constitute a United States trade or business.195  The mere performance of 
personal services, however, does not necessarily translate into a trade or 
business for purposes of deducting losses and business expenses.196  Because 
of this disparity, it is critical that the law clearly define “trade or business” in 
order to determine whether a barter transaction will be taxable to the person 
performing the services. 
A central purpose of this proposal is to simplify and clarify an ambiguous 
legal area and to bring average people who occasionally barter in a 
nonbusiness context into compliance with the law.  Therefore, it makes sense 
to tie the definition of “trade or business” for purposes of taxing barter 
transactions to the definition of “trade or business” for purposes of determining 
the deductibility of expenses under Code Section 162.197  This link to the 
definition contained in Section 162 is not suggested because of the absolute 
                                                 
 191. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 192. The new section should fall somewhere within the range of Code sections 101 to 150, as 
it would be an express exclusion from gross income.  See I.R.C. §§ 101–50 (2006). 
 193. See Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 27 (1987). 
 194. See generally F. Ladson Boyle, What Is a Trade or Business?, 39 TAX LAW. 737, 738 
(1986). 
 195. I.R.C. § 864(b) (2006).  However, there is a de minimus exception for nonresident aliens 
who do not work more than ninety days in the U.S., do not receive more than $3,000 as 
compensation, and serve a foreign person, entity, or office.  Id. § 864(b)(1). 
 196. See, e.g., Higgins v. Comm’r., 312 U.S. 212, 217 (1941). 
 197. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006). 
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clarity of that denotation.198  Rather, it is suggested because the meaning of 
“trade or business” under that section is relatively well-established and, 
perhaps more importantly, the link would impart an awareness of a duty to 
report barter transactions to those who attempt to take business expense 
deductions under Section 162. 
Under current federal income tax law, an individual taxpayer199 may deduct 
noncasualty losses200 only if such losses are incurred in a trade or business.201  
A taxpayer also may deduct ordinary and necessary business expenses 
(“Section 162 business expenses”), as well as expenses incurred from a 
transaction entered into for a profit that is not connected with a trade or 
business (“Section 212 investment expenses”).202  A Section 162 business 
expense, other than an expense related to the taxpayer as an employee,203 is 
generally completely deductible for purposes of computing adjusted gross 
income.204 
Section 212 investment expenses and Section 162 employee expenses are 
only completely deductible for purposes of computing adjusted gross income 
in a handful of limited situations.  For example, expenses are generally 
completely deductible only if they (1) are due to a sale or exchange,205 (2) are 
attributable to royalty-producing property or rent,206 (3) result from a penalty 
for early withdrawal,207 or (4) are due to the repayment of certain 
unemployment compensation benefits.208  If a Section 212 investment expense, 
or a Section 162 employee expense, is not completely deductible under one of 
these provisions, it generally will be a miscellaneous itemized deduction.  
                                                 
 198. See Boyle, supra note 194, at 739 (noting that the Section 162 factors started in Higgins 
“have not been uniformly considered or applied and have produced illogical results”). 
 199. Corporations are not limited to deducting losses and expenses in connection with a trade 
or business or a transaction entered into for a profit, but if a corporation incurs losses in 
connection with property that it owns without a profit motive, the loss may be disallowed.  See 
I.R.C. § 274(a)(1) (2006); Comm’r v. Gilt Edge Textile Corp., 173 F.2d 801, 803 (3d Cir. 1949); 
Juniper Inv. Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 356, 356–57 (Ct. Cl. 1964). 
 200. A casualty loss is a loss that arises “from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or 
from theft.”  I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (2006). 
 201. Id. § 165(c)(1). 
 202. Id. § 162; see id. § 165(c)(2); id. § 212 (permitting deductions for expenses in 
“production or collection of income . . . [or] management conservation, or maintenance of 
property held for the production of income . . .”). 
 203. Although this is somewhat counterintuitive, it is well-established that, for federal 
income tax purposes, “[b]eing an ‘employee’ constitutes a business in itself.”  DODGE ET AL., 
supra note 111, at 568. 
 204. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1T(c)(1) (2009). 
 205. Id. § 1.62-1T(c)(4). 
 206. Id. § 1.62-1T(c)(5). 
 207. Id. § 1.62-1T(c)(10). 
 208. Id. § 1.62-1T(c)(13). 
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Thus, it will be deductible only to the extent that it exceeds two percent of the 
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.209 
If a taxpayer’s objective is to completely deduct an expense, it is preferable 
to have the activity classified as a “trade or business” under Section 162.210  It 
is, therefore, critical to know what constitutes a “trade or business” under 
Section 162.  According to the United States Supreme Court in the landmark 
case of Higgins v. Commissioner, a Section 162 “trade or business” is 
determined by the “facts of each case.”211  Years of subsequent case law has 
somewhat clarified this standard.  As Professor F. Ladson Boyle has explained, 
     In keeping with Higgins, the lower courts and the IRS have used 
four specific criteria to determine if a taxpayer is engaged in a trade 
or business: 
     (1) Good faith intention of making a profit or producing income; 
     (2) Extensive activity over a substantial period of time; 
     (3) Whether the activity has actually begun; and 
     (4) Whether the taxpayer holds himself out “to others as engaged 
in the selling of goods and services.”212 
Higgins was the first case in which the Court directly addressed the issue of 
what constituted a “trade or business” for purposes of Section 162.213  
Later cases refined the “facts of each case” standard to provide clarity,214 
specifically by adding detail to the four-part test described by Professor 
Boyle.215  First, to have a trade or business, the taxpayer must have a profit 
                                                 
 209. See I.R.C. §§ 63(a), 63(d), 67(a), 67(b) (2006). 
 210. Note, however, that classification as a “trade or business” may be disadvantageous for 
other purposes.  For example, I.R.C. § 1401 taxes self-employment earnings of an individual from 
a trade or business.  See I.R.C. § 1401 (2006). 
 211. Higgins v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212, 217 (1941).  When this case was decided, there was 
“no corollary to current § 212(1) and (2).”  DODGE ET AL., supra note 111, at 567. 
Congressional dissatisfaction with Higgins led to the prompt enactment in 1942 of what 
are now §§ 212(1) & (2) (expenses relating to the “production of income”), 167(a)(2) 
(depreciation on property “held for the production of income”), and 165(c)(2) (losses 
on “transactions entered into for a profit”). 
     It is significant that Congress did not address Higgins by redefining “business” to 
include “investment” but instead enacted a set of Code provisions that independently 
allow investment deductions. 
Id. at 567–68 (emphasis added). 
 212. Boyle, supra note 194, at 739 (footnotes omitted). 
 213. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 215–16.  In a slightly earlier case, Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 
493 (1940), the Court assumed there was a trade or business and addressed the issue of whether 
an expense was an “ordinary and necessary” business expense. 
 214. See, e.g., Whipple v. Comm’r, 373 U.S. 193 (1961); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. 
Helvering, 313 U.S. 121 (1941); United States v. Pyne, 313 U.S. 127, 129–30 (1941). 
 215. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
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motive.216  This, by its very nature, is a subjective test.217  Second, the activity 
must be extensive.218  This generally means the activity must be both 
continuous and regular.219  Third, courts typically consider whether the 
taxpayer holds herself out to others as engaged in selling goods or services.220  
Although this factor is not generally dispositive, it certainly must be 
considered.221  Accordingly, if the taxpayer holds herself out as engaged in 
selling goods or services, she is more likely to have a trade or business.  
Finally, courts consider whether the activity has actually commenced.222  In the 
landmark case Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a company was not in a trade 
or business because it had not yet begun its operations.223  Other courts, 
however, have attempted to limit the holding of this case.224 
As Professor Boyle has noted, the “vast majority” of activities easily fit 
within his four-part test.225  Although there may be grey areas,226 the standard 
is relatively clear, and the IRS is accustomed to determining if there is a trade 
or business for purposes of Section 162.  Additionally, the possibility of 
obtaining business-expense deductions is an incentive for taxpayers to attempt 
to classify their activities as a trade or business, and thus an incentive to report 
barter income. 
I propose that whenever Barterer A exchanges services for other services or 
property, Barterer A should have no immediate income from the transaction 
unless Barterer A’s services constitute a “trade or business” under the above 
                                                 
 216. See supra note 212 and accompanying text; see also Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 
23, 35 (1987) (“We accept the fact that to be engaged in a trade or business, the taxpayer must be 
involved in the activity with continuity and regularity and that the taxpayer’s primary purpose for 
engaging in the activity must be for income or profit.  A sporadic activity, a hobby, or an 
amusement diversion does not qualify.”). 
 217. See Malmstedt v. Comm’r, 578 F.2d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 1978).  The “intent to make a 
profit” requirement can be met even if the taxpayer never actually makes a profit.  Id.  This 
requirement is met as long as the taxpayer makes a good-faith effort to make a profit.  Id. 
 218. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 219. See, e.g., McDowell v. Ribicoff, 292 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1961) (noting that the 
activities of a nonprofessional fiduciary were not sufficiently continuous and regular to constitute 
a trade or business). 
 220. See Boyle, supra note 194, at 746–48 & nn.63–75.  The Supreme Court has said that 
this is a factor that may be considered, but that it is not dispositive in finding that a trade or 
business exists. 
 221. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 25 (stating that “while the offering of goods and services 
usually would qualify the activity as a trade or business, this factor . . . is not an absolute 
prerequisite”). 
 222. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 223. Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 909 (4th Cir. 1965). 
 224. See, e.g., Blitzer v. United States, 684 F.2d 874, 880 (Ct. Cl. 1981); United States v. 
Manor Care, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 355, 359–60 (D. Md. 1980). 
 225. Boyle, supra note 194, at 750. 
 226. See, e.g., id. 
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four-part test.227  If Barterer A’s services constitute his trade or business, then 
Barterer A will have immediate taxable income. 228  This results regardless of 
whether he received other services or property in exchange for his service.229  
This rule is necessary to prevent people from using barter transactions 
primarily to avoid taxes on income derived from services performed as part of 
their business. 
If Barterer A’s services do not constitute his trade or business, then any 
services that Barterer A receives in return for his services will be tax-free for 
Barterer A.  This rule reflects the current reality that nearly all service-for-
service barters are not arranged through a barter-exchange company.230  If 
Barterer A’s services do not constitute his trade or business, then any property 
Barterer A receives in return for his services will be tax-free for him as well, 
but Barterer A will take that property with an income tax basis of zero.  This is 
sensible because if Barterer A subsequently converts that property to cash by 
selling it, he should pay taxes on that cash.231  At that point liquidity is no 
longer an issue, and most people would expect to pay taxes on a sale for 
cash.232 
C.  Exchange of Property 
1.  In General 
If Barterer A exchanges personal property233 for other property or services, I 
propose that a new nonrecognition provision apply to Barterer A, unless 
Barterer A held the property for investment or for productive use in a trade or 
business.  Notably, this new nonrecognition provision would not affect the 
potential applicability of other nonrecognition provisions that currently exist in 
the Code.234 
The general rule is that personal property exchanged for other property or 
services should receive nonrecognition treatment.235  However, if the 
                                                 
 227. The services or goods received by Barterer A should be treated as cash solely for 
purposes of applying the four-part test.  It, therefore, would be possible for a person to have a 
trade or business solely from frequently bartering those services, even though the taxpayer never 
receives any cash for his services. 
 228. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 229. The amount of income is based on the fair market value of the goods or services 
received.  Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (2006). 
 230. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 231. The gain would be equal to the sales price minus the basis, which would initially be 
zero.  I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2006).  Whether that gain is long-term or short-term will depend on how 
long Barterer A has held those assets.  If he has held them for more than one year, the gain will be 
long-term and taxable at preferential rates.  I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006). 
 232. See generally supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 233. The term “property” in this proposal means only personal property, not real property. 
 234. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1031, 1033 (2006). 
 235. Under current law, I.R.C. § 1031 (2006) does not apply to personal-use assets. 
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exchanged property is an investment asset or is owned in connection with a 
trade or business, then it should not receive nonrecognition treatment unless 
another nonrecognition provision applies to the transaction.236  The reason for 
this distinction is that Congress has already decided when nonrecognition 
should apply to exchanges of property held for investment or business 
purposes.  If the transfer of property does not qualify for nonrecognition under 
this new rule or under one of the currently existing nonrecognition rules, then 
Barterer A would have to recognize income to the extent that the value of 
goods or services that he receives exceeds his basis in the property that he 
transfers to Barterer B. 
The reality is that this new nonrecognition provision should have very little 
actual effect, given that most personal property is likely to decline in value.  
Thus, in most cases, the basis will exceed the fair market value of the property 
or services received in exchange for the transferred personal property, and no 
taxes will be owed.237 
2.  Nonrecognition Provisions 
Under one of the most well-established tax-law principles, gain or loss on 
the sale or exchange of property must be recognized as taxable income unless a 
specific nonrecognition rule applies to the transaction.238  Statutory 
nonrecognition rules include239 like-kind exchanges,240 involuntary 
conversions,241 exchange of contracts,242 exchange of government 
                                                 
 236. I.R.C. § 1031.  “Trade or business” here should have the same meaning as it does with 
respect to exchanges of services.  Thus, the four-part test should be applied to determine whether 
there is a trade or business.  See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 237. See I.R.C. § 165(c) (2006) (providing that personal losses may not be deducted). 
 238. I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2006). 
 239. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list.  It is merely a list of certain significant 
nonrecognition provisions. 
 240. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (2006).  Under this rule, the transferor does not recognize gain or 
loss upon the exchange of property held for investment or for productive use in a trade or 
business (other than inventory) if the property received in exchange is “of like kind” and is also 
held either for investment or for productive use in a trade or business.  See Treas. Reg. § 103(a)-1 
(2009).  This rule generally does not apply to stock, bonds, property held primarily for sale 
(inventory), notes, partnership interests, certificates of trust, beneficial interests, securities, or 
evidence of debt or interest.  I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1031(a)-1.  Nor does it 
generally apply to personal property.  See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, IRS, PUBLICATION 544: 
SALES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS OF ASSETS 554 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p554.pdf. 
 241. I.R.C. § 1033(a) (2006).  This applies when property is destroyed, stolen, or condemned 
(or disposed of under the threat of condemnation) and the taxpayer receives replacement property 
or money.  Id. 
 242. I.R.C. § 1035(a) (2006).  “Exchange of contracts” includes exchanges of life-insurance 
contracts, exchanges of life-insurance contracts for endowment or annuity contracts, exchanges of 
annuity contracts, exchanges of endowment insurance contracts for annuity contracts, and certain 
exchanges of endowment insurance contracts.  Id. 
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obligations,243 exchange of stock for stock in the same corporation,244 
exchange of stock by a corporation for property contributed to that 
corporation,245 exchange of property for stock in a controlled corporation,246 
exchange of property for partnership interests,247 exchange of property to avoid 
conflicts of interest,248 certain sales of stock to an employee stock ownership 
plan (ESOP),249 and property transfers between spouses and former spouses.250 
If Barterer A exchanges personal property for other property or services and 
some cash, I propose that the cash be treated the same as boot251 received in a 
Section 1031 exchange.  Under that rule, realized gain must be recognized 
when boot is received, but the amount of recognized gain is limited to the 
amount of boot received.252 
Additionally, holding periods should be handled as the holding period under 
Section 1031 is handled.  Specifically, Barterer A should take any property 
received in exchange for transferred property with a tacked holding period.253 
D.  Earned Income Credit  
Because the potential for EIC abuse exists as long as bartering can be used 
to enable a person to qualify for the EIC,254 the EIC rules of Code Section 32 
should be amended.  More specifically, that section should expressly address 
income from bartering.  I propose that, for EIC purposes, “earned income” 
should include property or services received through bartering only if the 
services that the taxpayer performed qualify as a “trade or business” of that 
taxpayer under Section 162. 
E.  Reporting Requirements  
There is no question about it—people will, if given the opportunity, use 
bartering to avoid paying taxes.  By the late 1970s, a general “underground 
                                                 
 243. I.R.C. § 1037 (2006). 
 244. I.R.C. § 1036(a) (2006). 
 245. I.R.C. § 1032(a) (2006). 
 246. I.R.C. § 351(a) (2006).  For this provision to apply, the person transferring property to 
the corporation in exchange for the corporation’s stock must be in control of the transferee 
corporation (that is, own at least eighty percent of the voting stock and eighty percent of all other 
classes of stock) immediately after the transfer.  Id. 
 247. I.R.C. § 721(a) (2006). 
 248. I.R.C. § 1043(a) (2006). 
 249. I.R.C. § 1042(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 250. I.R.C. § 1041(a) (2006). 
 251. “Boot” means “cash or property that is not like-kind property.”  DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN: BULLETIN NO. 2005-7, at 529 (2005), available 
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb05-07.pdf. 
 252. See I.R.C. § 1031(c) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(c)-1 (2009). 
 253. See I.R.C. § 1223(1) (2006). 
 254. See supra Part I.C. 
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economy” of tax evaders had grown immensely large255 and the widespread 
use of barter-exchange companies induced the IRS to begin looking into 
organized bartering.256 
Once Congress became aware of the revenue lost from bartering,257 it took 
steps to ease IRS monitoring of barter-exchange companies.  Specifically, with 
the enactment of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 
(TEFRA), Congress made barter-exchange companies third-party record 
keepers under Code Section 7609.258  This meant that a member of a barter-
exchange company was entitled to notice of any summons sent to the company 
requesting that member’s records and, moreover, that the member was allowed 
to intervene to prevent the company from complying with the summons.259  
More importantly, Congress included barter-exchange companies in the 
definition of “broker” under Code Section 6045.260  With this, barter-exchange 
companies, like all other brokers, had to file annual information returns, 
detailing the barter activities of the members, with the IRS.261 
I heartily endorse the idea of a barter-exchange company reporting 
requirement.  Removing the requirement would be disastrous and would return 
us to the problems of the 1970s.  According to Professor Robert Keller, most 
members of barter-exchange companies are businesses.262  Assuming this 
remains true, these members, under my proposal, would still have a duty to 
include profits from bartering in their incomes.263  Thus, an unchanged 
reporting requirement by barter-exchange companies would continue to 
facilitate tax administration and enforcement efforts of the IRS.  Individuals 
who join barter-exchange companies to barter services that are not their trade, 
business, or property that qualifies as personal use assets, would have the 
burden of explaining on their individual income tax returns why the bartering 
proceeds are not includible in their incomes. 
                                                 
 255. See Steve Lohr, How Tax Evasion Has Grown, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1981, at 1. 
 256. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, IRS, SUPP. 45G-324, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 
1.02 (1982). 
 257. By the early 1980s, there were nearly 300 barter-exchange companies, with around 
60,000 members, exchanging about $300 million worth of goods and services each year.  See 
Keller, supra note 64, at 485. 
 258. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 311, 96 Stat. 
324, 601 (1982) (codified at I.R.C. § 7609(a)(I) (2006)).  TEFRA amended I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3) to 
define a third-party record keeper to include “any barter exchange (as defined in section 
6045(c)(3)).”  Id. (codified at I.R.S. §7603(b)(2)(c) (2006)).  Section 6045(c)(3) defines a “barter 
exchange” as “any organization of members providing property or services who jointly contract 
to trade or barter such property or services.”  Id. (codified at I.R.C. § 6045(c)(3) (2006)). 
 259. I.R.C. § 7609(b) (2006). 
 260. I.R.C. § 6045(c)(1) (2006). 
 261. Id. § 6045(a). 
 262. See Keller, supra note 64, at 502–03. 
 263. See supra Parts III.B.1, III.C.1. 
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With respect to the current reporting requirement, I would only suggest 
clarification.  As discussed, the term “barter exchange” is confusing.  Another 
term, such as “barter-exchange company” or “barter facilitator,” should be 
used.  In addition, the IRS should make it clearer on its website that there is a 
difference between a barter-exchange company’s reporting requirements and 
income inclusions of private bartering parties.  Finally, the IRS should clarify 
what “noncommercial” means with respect to the reporting requirement of 
barter-exchange companies.264  For example, it is not entirely clear whether 
certain formal arrangements, such as babysitting co-ops, are barter-exchange 
companies.265 
V.  CONCLUSION 
From a purely economic standpoint, there is no question that every true 
barter transaction should be treated exactly like an economically equivalent 
cash transaction.266  If the only consideration in designing tax policy were 
economic in nature, then income would be taxed accurately and fairly.  
Unfortunately, tax law is about much more than economics, and this 
complicates matters.  We must also consider the practicalities of taxation, 
including taxpayers’ respect, or lack thereof, for the tax system.  It is 
fundamental to always be aware of the reality of administering the tax system.  
In so doing, we must remember that taxpayers will perceive the system as 
unfair if they are treated as having income when they have not received cash, 
and will lose respect for the system if they view it as overly intruding into their 
individual lives.267  The tax laws that currently apply to barter transactions run 
the risk of these perceptions. 
People barter for different reasons.  For example, many people join 
babysitting cooperatives because babysitting services are prohibitively 
expensive, and they would like a way to occasionally go to a movie without 
breaking the bank.  These people might not give taxes a moment of thought.  
People may join a work carpool for similar reasons, although they may also be 
concerned about the environmental impact of millions of people driving 
individually to work.  Again, taxes may not even enter into the decision to 
carpool.  Similarly, people might participate in a program like “Time Dollars” 
because they think it is a way to bring their communities together by allowing 
people with less money to help each other.268  In short, none of these barter 
                                                 
 264. See Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 61. 
 265. See supra Part II.B. 
 266. See Keller, supra note 64, at 468. 
 267. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
 268. The desire to reinvent community spirit in certain neighborhoods seems to be growing.  
Hillary Clinton has noted: 
     In Morningside Gardens, a racially mixed cooperative housing complex in Harlem 
that is home to almost a thousand families, neighbors make a point of getting to know 
one another.  The complex includes a senior citizen center, a combination day care 
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transactions, in general, “replace” otherwise taxable market transactions—
parents commonly will forego an evening out if they have to pay for 
babysitting, employees will drive themselves to work, and poorer communities 
will “make do” with less rather than pay for services that they cannot afford. 
In stark contrast to these nontax-motivated barter transactions, many people 
would, if possible, enter into barter transactions solely to avoid paying income 
taxes.  If an attorney could barter her services for a plumber’s without paying 
taxes on the value of the plumbing services received, the attorney would likely 
do it.  In this case, the bartering replaces an actual market transaction, because 
the lawyer would otherwise have to pay for the plumbing services with cash.  
These types of barters are most commonly, although not exclusively, done 
through a formal barter-exchange company. 
Others might barter for a combination of tax and nontax reasons.  For 
example, a lawyer may assume that he will get more business if he joins a 
barter-exchange company in addition to the tax benefits the barter arrangement 
would provide.  If he can do this without paying taxes on his services, he 
would likely view the arrangement as yielding a double benefit. 
Tax law must consider that barter transactions occur for a variety of reasons, 
some of which the Code should encourage—occasional barter transactions that 
bring communities together and help the environment, absent a clear intent to 
evade taxes, should be tax-free.  If, however, a person barters in connection 
with a trade or business or in connection with assets held for business or 
investment purposes, the transaction should be taxed like any other business or 
investment activity.  In this case, the risk of tax evasion greatly exceeds the 
potential community and environmental benefits of the transaction. 
It seems that the IRS is already attempting to implement many of this 
Article’s proposals.  By tying the barter-exchange company reporting 
requirement to contractual obligations in the business context, the IRS is 
ensuring that most other types of barter transactions will go unreported and 
therefore untaxed.  That said, our current law is subject to discretionary abuse 
by the government, and it is unfair to the few law-abiding taxpayers that report 
all barter transactions, even those not associated with a barter-exchange 
company.  It also puts accountants and lawyers in the awkward position of 
being compelled to report, or to advise clients to report, income that people 
without accountants and lawyers generally do not report.  For these reasons, 
the law should be changed. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
center and nursery school, a bank, and a grocery store.  The complex has its own 
security patrol and a newspaper that spreads word of births, deaths, and other 
community news.  Residents place a special emphasis on giving young people a stake 
in the life of the community.  There are recreation and tutoring programs, and children 
and teens are recruited for cleanup projects and other neighborhood activities. 
Clinton, supra note 1, at 135–36. 
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